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 Self-selection and the returns to geographic mobility:





This paper investigates the causal e⁄ect of geographic labour mobility on in-
come. The returns to German East-West migration and commuting are estimated
exploiting the structure of centrally planned economies and a "natural experiment"
of German reuni￿cation for identi￿cation. I ￿nd that migration premium is insignif-
icantly di⁄erent from zero, the returns for commuters equal to four percent of the
mean of the total income, and the local average treatment e⁄ects for compliers are
insigni￿cant. In addition, estimation results suggest no positive self-selection for mi-
grants, and some evidence of positive self-selection for commuters. Based on these
results, moving West does not appear to be a highly rewarded option in Germany.
JEL Classi￿cation: F22, J61, J62, R23.
Keywords: returns to geographic mobility, causality, treatment e⁄ects
￿I am grateful to Andrea Ichino for his extremely helpful advices and suggestions, to Frank Vella for
his econometric guidance and help with the codes, and to Katharina Spiess for granting me access to the
geo-code data. I bene￿ted a lot from the discussions at the DIW SOEP group during my stay there as a
guest researcher. I also would like to thank Barry Chiswick, Jennifer Hunt, Joachim Frick, Andre Meier,
Holger Bonin and seminar participants at the European University Institute, IZA Summer School, Second
IZA AM2 Meeting, and IV BRUCCHI LUCHINO Labour economics workshop for their comments. All
errors are mine.
yEuropean University Institute, Department of Economics. E-mail: anzelika.zaiceva@iue.it
1 1 Introduction
With cumulative net migration of 7.5% of the original population over the period 1989-
2001, East Germany shows the second highest emigration rates (after Albania) among
the countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain (Br￿cker and Tr￿bswetter, 2004, Heiland,
2004). This is, however, much less than was expected, given the similar cultural back-
ground between East and West Germany, and some explanations have been suggested in
the literature.1 The emigration rates have tended to slightly increase again since 1997,
and there seems to be no sign of the income convergence from 1995 onwards (Figure 1 and
OECD, 2001). Moreover, due to the particular geography of Germany, commuting to the
West is a popular option for those who do not want to incur ￿xed costs of moving, and
it may substitute for emigration (Hunt, 2000). These phenomena have raised concerns
that individuals with high abilities move to the West ("brain drain") and contribute to
sluggish economic growth in the East, as well as the question of how large the mobility
premium is in the West. These issues are also gaining general importance in light of
the eastern enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 and subsequent european
East-West migration.2
While answering these questions, it is important, however, to separate the pure e⁄ect
of geographic mobility from the e⁄ect of confounding factors. The reason why doing this
is di¢ cult is, usually, the unavailability of the relevant data and / or credible exclusion
1See Burda (1995) for an option value of waiting theory of migration.
2See among others Br￿cker et al (2003), Zaiceva (2004) for the assessment of potential emigration
after EU enlargement, and Gilpin et al (2006) for the ￿rst study of the impact of this migration on the
UK labour market.
2restrictions. As a result, in contrast to the research on another sort of investment in
human capital - returns to education, there exists no study up do date that estimates the
causal e⁄ect of geographic mobility on income. This paper attempts to ￿ll this gap. In its
main contribution to the literature, it exploits the structure of centrally planned economy
of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) together with the unique event of
German reuni￿cation to make causal statements about the returns to geographic mobility
from East to West Germany, controlling for the potential self-selection on unobservables.
This study also contributes to the literature that explains sluggish East-West German
migration after uni￿cation (Burda, 1995). Finally, it can be also viewed in the broader
context of transition economics and recent eastern enlargement of the European Union.
Migration theory (Roy, 1951, Borjas, 1987, Chiswick, 1999) postulates that migrants
will be positively selected if the distribution of earnings is more unequal in the destination
region than in the origin.3 There exists a vast empirical literature on migration, in which
the authors have investigated the selectivity issue, using standard Heckman￿ s procedure,
or have documented the association between migration and income.4 The majority of
the existing empirical studies on East-West German migration address the question of
self-selection indirectly.5 The ￿rst study that explicitly addresses this issue is a recent
3Chiswick (1999, 2000) shows that Roy￿ s model is a special case of the human capital model of
migration (Sjaastad, 1962), in which migration is viewed as an investment in human capital, and that
it occurs if the present discounted value of the lifetime income stream in the destination region, net of
migration costs, is higher than the one in the source region.
4See, for example, the pioneering works of Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) and Grant and Vanderkamp
(1980), as well as more recents studies of Tunali (2000), Yankow (1999, 2003), Rodgers and Rodgers
(2000), Bauer et al (2002) and Yashiv (2004). Most recently, Ham, Li and Reagan (2004) have undertaken
an attempt to use propensity score matching to estimate the returns to migration within the US, relying,
however, on the strong assumption of unconfoundedness (selection on observables).
5Burda (1993), Burda et al (1998) analyze individuals￿intentions to move West. Hunt (2000) estimates
the reduced form multinomial logit of the decisions to move, to commute or to stay. See also Hunt (2006)
3paper by Br￿cker and Tr￿bswetter (2004), in which the authors ￿nd no robust evidence of
positive self-selection on unobservables for migrants over 1994-1997. As for the mobility
premium, Hunt (2001) shows that those who took a job in the West between 1990-1991
enjoyed large wage gains, but that the correlation between income and migration is small
or insigni￿cant for the subsequent movers. She concludes that an economy undergoing
a successful transition would initially have high returns to moving, which would fall as
the transition progressed. It is not clear, however, what kind of e⁄ect is estimated6 and
how the selection on unobservables is dealt with.7 Thus, although the empirical studies
have analysed an association between income and migration, they have failed to plausibly
identify causal relationship.
This paper exploits programme evaluation techniques, and, using the language of
that literature, attempts to identify the e⁄ect of treatment (geographic mobility) on the
treated (mover), as well as the e⁄ect for compliers (a subpopulation of movers whose
status changes with the instrument). I investigate this question using both parametric
and nonparametric econometric methodologies. I use the GSOEP dataset, which has a
longitudinal structure due to which it is possible clearly to identify movers. Another
big advantage of this dataset is that it contains pre-uni￿cation information. The main
disadvantage, however, is the small number of observations for movers. I merge it with
the con￿dential geo-code data on the individual place of residence.
and the references therein.
6See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a discussion of when it may be more useful to estimate
the e⁄ect of treatment on the treated than to estimate an average treatment e⁄ect.
7Hunt (2001) recognizes these issues by noting that "the coe¢ cients on the moving dummies should
not be interpreted as the return to an exogenous move by a random worker, because movers are likely to
be unobservably di⁄erent from stayers" (p.192).
4The following instruments are constructed for migration and commuting respectively
in order to identify the returns to geographic mobility - home ownership before uni￿ca-
tion, and a dummy which equals one if an individual before uni￿cation lived in a county
("kreis") that had a common border with West Germany. Both instruments approximate
theoretical costs of moving: the former captures the well-established negative relation be-
tween home ownership and the propensity to migrate, while the later captures the costs
of commuting West that increase with distance from the border. As shown below, in
the former GDR housing decisions and voluntary geographic labour mobility were usually
restricted by political considerations. In making these decisions, little was left to the un-
observable abilities and motivation. Finally, German reuni￿cation was not anticipated by
anybody until shortly before the event. Although one still may argue that the allocation
of housing, jobs and residence of individuals in the Communist economy was not random,
it was mostly based on the factors that are not relevant for the market economy and the
post-uni￿cation individual incomes, which are, thus, ignorable. Of course, the validity of
these instruments is open to doubt; however, the evidence presented in this paper seems
to suggest that the assumptions hold at least for commuters.
The main ￿ndings of the paper are as follows. First, I ￿nd no evidence of positive
selection on unobservables for East-West German migrants and some evidence of positive
self-selection for commuters. Second, the mobility premium is small for both migrants and
commuters, independently of the model used and the assumptions made. Both parametric
and nonparametric selection models suggest no signi￿cant returns for migrants in terms
of total long-term income, and the local average treatment e⁄ect for compliers is also
5insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The returns for commuters are slightly higher and
equal to 4% of the mean of the total income, and the local average treatment e⁄ect for
compliers is insigni￿cant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the description of the data,
de￿nitions and sample selection. Section 3 justi￿es the instruments. Section 4 outlines
estimation strategy. Estimation results are discussed in section 5, and section 6 provides
a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data, de￿nitions and sample selection
The data used in this paper are extracted from the public use ￿le of the representative
German panel household survey (GSOEP)8, and are merged with the con￿dential ge-
ographical coding of individual places of residence. Due to the GSOEP￿ s longitudinal
structure, it is possible to identify and trace movers (and their incomes). Another advan-
tage of this dataset is that the ￿rst wave of the eastern sample was drawn in June 1990,
i.e. before the monetary union and formal uni￿cation took place, and, thus, it provides a
unique opportunity to use pre-uni￿cation data to construct the exogenous source of vari-
ation in mobility. The main disadvantage of the dataset, however, is the small number of
observations for movers.
An individual is de￿ned as a migrant if he has changed his residence from East to
West Germany at least once during 1990-2001; otherwise he is a stayer. An individual is
8See SOEP Group (2001) for a description of the dataset.
6a commuter if he lives in the East and his region of work is West Germany in any of the
years 1990-2001.9 A de￿nition of income is not trivial in such a study. Theory suggests
that while making a decision to move, an individual takes into account his total lifetime
income, and empirical studies ￿nd that the assimilation period matters.10 In order to be
consistent with the theoretical de￿nition of lifetime income, as well as willing to avoid the
problem of transitory income drop right after move and to save observations, I have used
the mean of annual incomes as a dependent variable.11 I thus average over the available
years for stayers. For migrants, I average over the available years after an individual
migrates, and for commuters - over the years during which an individual commutes. The
total annual income is de￿ned as a sum of labour income (sum of wages, second-job and
self-employment earnings) and various social security bene￿ts (such as unemployment
bene￿ts, maternity bene￿ts etc). The mean income is set to missing only if information
on all the components is missing.12 All incomes are in￿ ated to 2001 by regional CPIs and
are expressed in DM.
The instruments used in this study are as follows. For migration, I construct a dummy
9Note that by de￿ning migrants in this way I have to include commuters within "stayers", and by
de￿ning commuters, I have to include actual and potential migrants within "stayers". Although dropping
them from a control group could help to clarify the de￿nitions, this would introduce a sample selection
problem. Nevertheless, below I also experiment with excluding actual and potential movers from the
respective comparison groups (see Section 6).
10It is argued that estimates based on earnings data with limited time horizons will not capture life-
cycle wage growth, tending to downward bias in the estimated returns (Greenwood, 1997). See Yankow
(2003), Greenwood (1997) for a discussion of the potential biases, and Yankow (1999) and Rogers and
Rogers (2000) for the attempts to capture the long-term earnings e⁄ects.
11Siebern (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), and Carneiro and Lee (2004) use similar cumulative
de￿nitions.
12I also exclude the obvious outliers from the sample, i.e. individuals whose average annual income is
less than 1000 DM (19 observations) or greater than 130000 (5 observations). I have experimented with
the lower threshold at 100, 500 and 1000 DM, and the upper threshold at 100 000 DM, using the so-called
"winsorising" procedure, in which 2.5% of the outliers from both tails were given the closest neighbour￿ s
value, and keeping all individuals in the sample. The results were not a⁄ected to any great extent.
7which equals one if an individual was a home-owner in 1990, and is zero otherwise. 32%
of respondents in 1990 in East Germany reported being a house / ￿ at owners. For com-
muting, an instrument equals one if an individual resided in a county ("kreise") close to
the Western border (i.e. that had a common border with West Germany or West Berlin)
before uni￿cation.13 Approximately 30% of persons lived in such counties in 1990.
I restrict the sample to easterners who were living in East Germany in 1990, exclude
pensioners and students, and use the incomes of individuals who are 18 years old or
more in each year.14 Final sample sizes in the most restricted speci￿cations are 3,043
observations for migration (of whom around 6% are migrants), and 2,953 observations
for commuting (of whom around 15% are commuters). In line with the aggregate data
on migration in Figure 1, the number of migrants was large right after uni￿cation, then
decreased, but tends to increase again since 1997. Commuting seems to follow an opposite
trend.
Kernel densities of average total annual incomes for movers and stayers are shown
in Figure 2. As expected, the distribution of incomes for stayers is more compressed,
and there are more migrants and commuters in the upper tail of income distribution.
Descriptive statistics for the key variables is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. The ￿rst
two columns show means and standard deviations for migrants and stayers, the last two
13One may suggest dropping Berlin from the sample given its very speci￿c geographical and political
situation. I reestimated all the models below dropping Berlin, and the results did not change much, the
main di⁄erence being a smaller e⁄ect for commuters. These results are available upon request.
14I also drop the return and multiple migrants (around 20%) and do not analyze them separately in
this paper, given the insu¢ cient number of observations, unclear lifetime income de￿nition, and since I
am interested in the returns to permanent migration. See, for example, Rogers and Rogers (2000) for a
similar approach. Recognizing, however, that the exclusion of multiple movers could bias the results, in
the sensitivity analysis below I also estimate the models using data for all migrants.
8- for commuters and stayers. As can be seen from the table, all potential movers have
on average a higher total annual income than stayers. Compared to stayers, migrants
tend not to own a house in 1990, and commuters tend to live in the border regions
in 1990. As expected, potential movers are younger, single and better educated than
stayers. Thus, there exists a preliminary evidence of positive selection of both migrants
and commuters with regard to pre-treatment university degree and income. There are
more males among commuters, however, more females among migrants. On the other
hand, there are fewer individuals with any kind of vocational training among any movers,
more government sector employees among migrants, but fewer among commuters, and
fewer blue-collar employees among migrants, but more among commuters. Table A1
presents some systematic di⁄erences in observable characteristics between movers and
stayers; thus, there is reason to suspect, a priori, that selection on unobservables will be
an issue. To cope with this, I rely in the remainder of the paper on the instrumental
variables, which are justi￿ed in the next section.
3 Are the instruments legitimate?
In order to make causal statements about the returns to geographic mobility, it is im-
portant to justify the validity of the instruments. Unfortunately, this assumption cannot
be tested, and one has to rely on the available general facts. To be a valid instrument,
pre-uni￿cation home ownership and residence dummies must a⁄ect income only through
migration or commuting, i.e. they must be uncorrelated with any non-ignorable confound-
9ing factors that a⁄ect ex-post income in the market economy, such as ability or motivation.
This can be justi￿ed by referring to the structure of centrally planned economies.15
In GDR, as in any communist societies, there was a high degree of centralization in
the labour and product markets: all ￿rms were owned by the state and an elaborate
plan directed the allocation of inputs, the distribution of outputs, wage levels and prices
(Krueger and Pischke, 1995)16. To secure constant prices for inhabitants, the state bore
80% of costs of basic supplies, from bread to housing. Shortages were a norm. The
distribution of income was compressed, and wage inequality, as measured by the Gini
coe¢ cient, was very low.17 O¢ cial unemployment was absent, since workers were kept
ine¢ ciently in companies even if they were unproductive, or the government quickly found
a new job for anybody who might have been displaced in order to achieve the goal of full
employment.18 The communist ideology stressed uniformity of outcomes, irrespective
of individual di⁄erences in ability or e⁄ort. Political tolerance was also important: the
system functioned smoothly only when its component parts were sta⁄ed with individuals
whose values coincided with those of the regime.
Moreover, housing and occupational choices, and thus voluntary geographic labour
mobility, were restricted. In principle, everyone had a right to a house; however, due
15Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Sch￿ndeln (2005) use a similar logic and the structure of the centrally planned
economy of ex-GDR to identify precautionary savings in post-uni￿cation East Germany.
16In 1985, for example, state-owned enterprises and collectives earned 96.7 percent of the total net
national income.
17Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Sch￿ndeln (2005) report that in 1988, the average net income of individuals with
a university degree was only 15% higher than that of blue-collar workers. Also, intersectoral di⁄erences in
net incomes were minimal, amounting to only 150 Marks per month on average with an average monthly
income of around 1,100 Marks in 1988.
18The signi￿cant misallocation of labour in centrally planned economies is well known. See, for instance,
Kruger and Pischke (1995) for a comparison of East and West German labour markets before and after
uni￿cation.
10to rationing by the state (i.e. a mechanism called the System of Material Balances),
long queues were a norm.19 Access to housing quality was regulated largely through
informal (and often politically mediated) networks (Buechtemann and Schupp, 1992). In
many ways access to material and social activities in ex-GDR was mediated through the
sphere of work, and, in particular, the FDGB unions acted as the prime political links
between the working population and the Socialist power elite embodied in the SED party,
and as key agents in the distribution of housing (ibid). In general, ￿ ats may have been
allocated to individuals due to urgent need or merit, personal connections or corruption,
or by inheritance. And those who paid a nominal rent for a state-owned ￿ at enjoyed
considerable consumer surplus (Kornai, 1980). As for occupational choice, job o⁄ers were
usually made to individuals right after the completion of their education and according
to the Socialist plan. Even admissions to the various ￿elds were regulated by the plan.20
Overall, the Communist system operated like a large internal labour market, with
rules and party membership playing an important role in the allocation of jobs and wages
(Krueger and Pischke, 1995). Thus, little was left to the individual abilities and motiva-
tion. Finally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 could not been foreseen. Therefore, to
the extent that individuals had not been self-selecting into home ownership statuses or
into the regions on the basis of their unobservable characteristics relevant for the market
economy, the instruments provide the exogenous source of variation in mobility, and the
19The "waiting list" could be very long. For example, the wait for an apartment in the Soviet Union
during the 1980s was typically 10 to 15 years; as a result, families had to plan and buy the housing for
their children to live in in advance (www.wikipedia.com).
20In fact, only a certain quota of students was allowed to complete the last two years of high school,
necessary to attend university. Additional criteria were membership in the o¢ cial youth organisation,
political tolerance, and family background (Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Sch￿ndeln, 2005).
11assignment to treatment is strongly ignorable.
However, the exclusion restriction assumption is violated if pre-uni￿cation home own-
ership directly a⁄ects post-uni￿cation income of migrants (after controlling for human
capital, occupation and regional macro-indicators), and if living in the border regions or
not before uni￿cation per se matters for the ex-post income of commuters (after control-
ling for the same factors). The former would be true if, for example, more able persons
were also more successful in gaining access to their own housing, leading to an upward
bias in the estimates. As for the latter, in the former GDR, it was likely for only those
who supported the regime (i.e. party members and the so-called "nomenklatura") to be
allowed to live close to the western border. If these people were also more motivated /
active / able, the validity of the instrument may be violated unless one controls for the
"nomenklatura e⁄ect". Fortunately, Bird, Frick and Wagner (1998) provide a proxy for
party membership and nomenklatura status - telephone availability before uni￿cation.21
Thus, in Section 6 I also control for this e⁄ect.
Finally, before using di⁄erent models to estimate the e⁄ect of moving, an informal
exercise can be undertaken in order to further justify the instruments. If the instruments
approximate a randomized experiment, the characteristics of those for whom the instru-
ment equals one must be equal to those for whom it equals zero, meaning that persons are
randomly assigned across the two groups. Table A2 shows that for migration, the home
ownership dummy is indeed orthogonal to some covariates, although some di⁄erences (at
21They argue that in GDR only 20% of individuals had a telephone before uni￿cation (in West Germany,
97%), and a telephone was a sort of in-kind bene￿t for distinguished party members, since, like many
other goods, it was not freely available in the economy of shortages.
125%) seem to exist in many of them. In contrast to the expectations, however, the more
educated and those having a higher pre-treatment individual income are less likely to own
a house before uni￿cation. Thus, it is likely that housing was not randomly allocated to
individuals in the Communist economy, however such allocation was probably based on
some political factors and personal connections and not on the unobservables that are
relevant for the market economy, such as individual ability. Moreover, di⁄erences in most
characteristics, although statistically signi￿cant, are not large economically, i.e. di⁄er-
ences in all characteristics range from 9 to 20% of the respective standard deviations. For
commuting, the border regions dummy is orthogonal to all covariates with the exception
of telephone availability in 1990, which actually con￿rms the fact that only politically
tolerant persons lived / were allowed to live in the border regions.
Therefore, although one still may argue that the allocation of housing, jobs and res-
idence of individuals in the Communist economy was not random, it was mostly based
on the factors that are not relevant for the market economy and the post-uni￿cation in-
dividual incomes. Thus, I believe that the evidence presented in this section allows us to
use the two instruments for the analysis and to make a valid causal inference, at least for
commuting.
4 Econometric methodology
In order to estimate the causal e⁄ect of geographic mobility on the income of movers,
potential outcomes model is used. Let Y1i and Y0i denote individual i￿ s potential income
13with and without movement. Then:
Y1i = X1i￿1 + "1i (1)
Y0i = X0i￿0 + "0i (2)
where Xki are individual socio-economic characteristics, ￿
0s are unknown parameters,
E("ki) = 0; and k = f0;1g: Let Di = 1 if individual is a mover, and Di = 0 otherwise.
The outcome is observed only in one state, i.e. Yi(Di) = DiY1i + (1 ￿ Di)Y0i: After some
manipulations one can derive the following model:
Yi = ￿0 + Xi￿ + ￿iDi + ￿i (3)
where Yi is the observed outcome, and the "unconditional" error term ￿i has a zero
mean, i.e. E(￿ijXi) = 0; but E(￿ijDi;Xi) 6= 0.22
Assuming further that there exist costs of moving Ci, the following selection rule
applies:
Di = I(Y1i ￿ Y0i ￿ Ci > 0) = I(Z￿ {￿ + ui > 0) (4)
where Zi is a vector of exogenous variables, ￿ are the reduced form parameters and
E(ui) = 0. The errors ("1i;"0i;ui) are assumed to be correlated with covariances ￿ki,
22This is a so-called "random coe¢ cients model", in which there are potentially two sources of un-
observed heterogeneity: one that in￿ uences both the decision to move and labour market outcomes of
individuals (heterogeneity in ￿i), and another that is related to the idiosyncratic gain from mobility
(heterogeneity in responses to treatment ￿i).
14k = f0;1g: The self-selection works through this correlation in the errors.
The e⁄ect of interest in this study is an average e⁄ect of treatment on the treated
(ATT). Formally it can be written as follows:
ATT = E(￿ijZi;Di = 1) = E(Y1i ￿ Y0ijZi;Di = 1) =
= E(Y1ijZi;Di = 1) ￿ E(Y0ijZi;Di = 1) =
= E(￿i) + E(￿ijZi;Di = 1) (5)
where the e⁄ect is the di⁄erence between actual outcome for movers and a counter-
factual outcome for movers had they stayed. It equals to the average e⁄ect for a random
person in the population plus the idiosyncratic gain from treatment (the returns to un-
observables), and there is no a priori reason to expect E(￿ijZi;Di = 1) = 0: Thus, the
OLS estimation of (5) provides biased and inconsistent estimates.
To estimate the e⁄ect of moving West on income I, ￿rst, estimate parametric sample
selection model of Heckman (1976, 1979), then - the nonparametric sample selection
model of Das, Newey and Vella (2003), and calculate the treatment e⁄ect as the di⁄erence
between the actual outcome for movers and the counterfactual outcome for movers have
they stayed. I then also estimate the local average treatment e⁄ect for compliers (Angrist,
Imbens and Rubin, 1996).
The speci￿cation most widely used in migration studies is related to the representative
agent model and is estimated by the two-step parametric procedure developed by Heckman
(1976, 1979), wich assumes no idiosyncratic gain from treatment. The correction function
15is the inverse Mill￿ s ratio for each subsample. Note that this procedure requires exclusion
restrictons. In addition, if the joint normality assumption does not hold, it will produce
inconsistent estimates.
The nonparametric sample selection model that does not impose any distributional
assumptions and does not restrict the form of the correction function allows to overcome
the disadvantages of the above mentioned parametric approach. The estimation of such
model is considered in Das et al (2003), building on the prior work of Newey (1988). The
identi￿cation requires exclusion restrictions, and the model is identi￿ed up to an additive
constant. The approach amounts to estimating in the ￿rst step a conditional probability
of selection (propensity score) without making any distributional assumptions, and, in the
second step, to approximating the correction function with polynomial series. The order
of the correction term can be chosen using a leave-one-out cross-validation criterion.23
For the purposes of this paper, the estimation of the intercept is crucial. Hence, I also
use two semiparametric techniques to consistently estimate the intercept (Heckman, 1990
and Andrews and Schafgans, 1998).24
Finally, making no restrictions on unobserved heterogeneity and no distributional as-
sumptions, the Local Average Treatment E⁄ect (LATE) - causal treatment e⁄ect for the
subpopulation of compliers, can be estimated (Angrist et al, 1996).25 LATE has been
23This is the sum of squares of forecast errors, where all the other observations were used to predict
each single observation, and the speci￿cation with the smallest sum of forecast errors is chosen.
24I use 50% of both subsamples as a threshold value.
25Note that the Random Assignment, Exclusion Restrictions and a Non-zero E⁄ect of the Instrument on
the Treatment assumptions are satis￿ed based on the evidence presented in Sections 3 and 5, respectively.
Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption seems plausible, since movers constitute only a small fraction
of the population, thus ruling out general equilibrium e⁄ects. Finally, the assumption of Monotonicity
(no de￿ers) also seems plausible, since both owing a house and living far from the border constitute costs
for mobility.
16criticised for two reasons: it is identi￿ed only for a small fraction of population, which is
unobservable, and it is also instrument-dependent.
5 Estimating the e⁄ect of mobility on income
I use the standard Mincerian speci￿cation of the income functions. Variables such as
experience, education and marital status in 2001 are endogenous; thus, in my preferred
speci￿cation, I use only exogenous variables, such as sex, age and its square (as a proxy
for experience) and the predetermined marital status (as a proxy for "psychic" migration
costs) and human capital variables in 1990.
As can be seen from the second last row of Table A3, the instruments are "strong".26
As expected and consistent with other studies, the correlation between pre-uni￿cation
home ownership and propensity to migrate is negative, re￿ ecting theoretical costs of mi-
gration. The border with the West dummy has a large positive impact on the probability
of commuting and indicates that the costs of commuting, indeed increase with distance.
5.1 Results for migration
Assuming no idiosyncratic gain from migration and willing to compare my results to the
existent literature, I ￿rst estimate the standard Heckman￿ s selection model. The ￿rst
stage probit estimates (Table A3 column 1) con￿rm that, on average, younger people are
more likely to move West, and home owners are less likely to migrate, consistent with
26As a rule of thumb, to be considered "strong", the F-statistics from the linear regression of the
endogenous variable on the instrument must be not less than 10 (see Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002).
17expectations and in line with previous studies.27 Probit marginal e⁄ects indicate that
an additional year decreases probability of moving by 0.2 percentage points, while owing
a house decreases the likelihood of moving West by 4 percentage points. Males are 1
percentage point less likely to move West. Both university degree and marital status have
expected signs, but neither these variables nor vocational education or government sector
employment are signi￿cant. Finally, neither blue collar occupation in 1990, nor the state￿ s
unemployment rate a⁄ects probability to move West. Heckman￿ s second stage estimates
for migrants28 (Table A4 column 1) suggest that males have a higher total income than
females, experience as proxied by age and its square has the traditional concave pro￿le, and
university graduates earn more. However, neither vocational education nor occupational
dummies are signi￿cant for movers, suggesting that partly human capital acquired in the
centrally planned economy is not transferable / valuable in the West. Being married in
1990 reduces the ex-post income of movers. The coe¢ cient on the inverse Mills ratio is
positive, but insigni￿cant, thus indicating no evidence of positive self-selection for movers,
which is partly consistent with Br￿cker and Tr￿bswetter (2004). Estimates for stayers
(Table A4 column 2) suggest that, on average, male stayers have a higher total income
than females, university graduates earn more, experience has the expected sign, those who
had a vocational degree and were employed in the government sector in 1990 earn more,
and those in blue-collar occupations in 1990 earn less. The Mills ratio for stayers is also
insigni￿cant, which is in contrast to Br￿cker and Tr￿bswetter (2004), where the negative
27Note, however, that when the age squared is added to the probit regression, both age variables become
insigni￿cant.
28Standard errors in the second stage are corrected both for heteroskedasticity and generated regressors
(see Greene, 1981, Newey, 1984, Pagan, 1984).
18sign on the Mills ratio was found across 1994-1997.29 Finally, to test the normality
assumption I use the conditional moment test30, which indicates that normality cannot
be rejected, implying that Heckman￿ s estimates are consistent.
Nevertheless, I also experiment with the nonparametric sample selection model. In
the ￿rst stage, I estimate linear probability model (see Table A3 column 2) and construct
predicted probabilities. I also trim on propensity scores as suggested in Das et al (2003).
The cross-validation criterion indicates the linear correction function for movers and a
polynomial of order 3 for stayers (Table A6). Table A5 (columns 1-2) shows the non-
parametric second stage estimates.31 The coe¢ cients on covariates for both stayers and
movers are quite similar to the parametric Heckman￿ s model, apart from the correction
terms. When normality is not imposed, there is again no evidence of positive self-selection
for movers.
Finally, imposing neither distributional assumptions nor restrictions on the unobserved
heterogeneity, I estimate the model by IV-LATE framework of Angrist et al (1996). Ta-
ble A7 summarizes the so-called intention-to-treat e⁄ects (reduced form migration and
income equations), structural IV and OLS estimates (upper panel A). Column 1 shows
the coe¢ cient of the home ownership dummy in regressions for migration, and column
2 - the coe¢ cients of this dummy in the reduced form income equations (i.e. models
29However, one needs to keep in mind that the time span in this study is much larger, the de￿nitions
of migrants and income are di⁄erent, and the exclusion restrictions are also di⁄erent.
30See Newey (1985), Pagan and Vella (1989). To carry out the test, I construct the relevant moment
conditions (3rd and 4th moments) and regress them on a constant and scores from probit. Standard
errors on constants indicate whether normality holds.
31Standard errors are calculated according to the variance-covariance formula in Das et al (2003) and
are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and generated regressors.
19that exclude migration). Column 3 reports the IV estimates of the return to migration,
which are the ratios of the corresponding intentions-to-treat e⁄ects, and OLS estimates
are shown in column 4 for comparative purposes. As can be seen from this table, the IV
coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant. The standard errors are traditionally very large,
and the di⁄erence between the OLS and IV could be due to the sampling error. Thus,
the local average treatment e⁄ect for compliers shows that those individuals who migrate
if they did not own a house in 1990, and would have not migrated if they had owned a
house, have no signi￿cant returns to their ex-post total long-run income from migration.
One should bear in mind, however, that the results for migration have to be interpreted
with caution: there might still exist some doubts on the validity of the instrument, and
standard errors of the IV point estimate are very large ￿ ipping from large negative to
positive.
Table A8 shows treatment e⁄ects for migrants in the di⁄erent econometric models
used.32 Both parametric and nonparametric selection models produce not statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ects.33 Therefore, the e⁄ect of migration for migrants is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero, and the local average treatment e⁄ect for a subpopulation of compliers
is also not signi￿cant.34
Overall, several interesting ￿ndings occur from the estimates. First, no evidence of
positive self-selection on unobservables for East-West German migrants during 1990-2001
32To test the null of no signi￿cance of treatment e⁄ects for sample selection models, the t-statistics is
calculated as in the Oaxaca decomposition (Greene, 2000).
33at 5% level.
34Restricted model without human capital covariates generated qualitatively identical results (available
upon request).
20is found. Such a result is partly in line with Br￿cker and Tr￿bswetter (2004), and is also
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the human capital model on self-selection
(Chiswick, 1999), when direct out-of-pocket costs of migration are small. Given that the
inequality of earnings in East Germany has approached West German levels in the late
1990s, the standard Roy￿ s model would also predict that a positive selection bias of East-
West migrants should disappear. This, however, can also result from the above-mentioned
de￿nition of migration: the most able may choose to migrate, but also to commute or to
stay because of the new opportunities in the East, thus resulting in no signi￿cant self-
selection. Or it may also be due to the aggregation of data over ten years, i.e. the cohort
quality e⁄ect might be at work here, the ￿rst migrants being of better quality than the
subsequent movers.35 Finally, also a small number of observations for movers may play a
role.36
Second, both the treatment e⁄ect for migrants and the local average treatment e⁄ect
for compliers are insigni￿cant.37 This result might be a consequence of high unemployment
in the East, when people move West not in search of a higher income, but to escape from
unemployment, and it may also be the cause of return migration to the East. Together
with no positive selection for migrants, it may also re￿ ect attitudes towards risk38, or
35Ideally, one would need to run year-by-year regressions; unfortunately, the very small number of
observations for migrants preclude me from doing this. I have, however, reestimated all the models for
two periods, 1990-1995 and 1996-2001, and the results are available upon request.
36Note, however that the inverse Mills ratio is also insigni￿cant in the restricted model without lagged
education and occupation dummies.
37Given signi￿cant and positive OLS e⁄ect and insigni￿cant e⁄ect in Heckman￿ s and IV models, in-
signi￿cant Mills ratio are somewhat surprising. As mentioned above, this can be a consequence of the
small number of observations for movers. The upward bias in OLS can also be due to the omitted vari-
ables, where such variables are other (observable) characteristics that are positively corellated with the
regressors.
38Dohmen et al (2005) ￿nd that the East-West migrants are more willing to take risks in general (thus
21non-transferable human capital. Finally, the exclusion of earlier migration (1989-1990)
from the analysis due to the unavailability of data may bias the e⁄ects downward, since
high initial migration most probably left behind those with the highest migration costs.
These results, however, are not entirely surprising. Hunt (2001) ￿nds that the wage
gain is small or insigni￿cant for the post-1991 movers. Burda and Hunt (2001) ￿nd that
increased by western unions wages, indeed, kept the East Germans at home. Parikh and
Van Leuvensteijn (2003) conclude that because of wage convergence between East and
West Germany, wages did not play any consistent role in determining migration over 1991-
1999. A relevant question to ask then is, why people have decided to move if there are
no returns to migration. Possible answers could include too optimistic expectations while
calculating present value of the future income streams, other non-economic (for example,
ideological) reasons, or chosing an option to commute instead. Overall small number of
East-West German migrants and return migration to the East is, in fact, in line with
these ￿ndings.
5.2 Results for commuters
In order to estimate the treatment e⁄ects for commuters, I follow the same procedures
as with migrants. Reduced form probit estimates (Table A3 column 3) suggest that on
average males, young and those with university degrees and living in the border regions
in 1990 are more likely to commute West. Interestingly, blue-collar workers also have
are relatively less risk averse), however, they are less willing to take risks in their careers (and are thus
more risk averse with respect to their labour market incomes).
22a higher probability of commuting. And, as expected, individuals from the disadvan-
taged states tend to commute more. Second-stage parametric Heckman￿ s estimates for
commuters (Table A4 column 3) suggest that males and university graduates earn more
(although much less than migrants, suggesting again that human capital acquired in the
communist economy is only partially transferred to the West), and that experience has a
traditional concave pro￿le. For stayers (Table A4 column 4), in addition, being employed
in the government sector and having a vocational degree in 1990 a⁄ect their ex-post in-
comes positively, while being a blue-collar employee in 1990 a⁄ects this negatively. The
selection correction terms are insigni￿cant for both commuters and stayers. However,
the conditional moment test rejects the normality assumption, implying that parametric
estimates are inconsistent.
Estimates of the linear probability model, which are used to construct propensity
scores for the nonparametric sample selection model, are shown in Table A3 column 4.
The leave-one-out cross-validation criterion (Table A6) suggests a polynomial of order
2 for commuters and no correction polinomial for stayers. The estimated coe¢ cients
for both commuters and stayers (Table A5 columns 3-4) are again similar to those in the
parametric model, apart from the correction terms. In addition, the marginal e⁄ects of the
correction functions for commuters are positive, suggesting, thus, positive self-selection
for commuters.
Finally, I estimate the IV-LATE model of Angrist et al (1996), relaxing all the distri-
butional assumptions and assumptions of homogeneity. The lower panel B of Table A7
shows the respective intentions-to-treat e⁄ects, structural IV and OLS estimates. Again,
23IV point estimates are not statistically signi￿cant. Thus, the local average treatment
e⁄ect for persons who commute if they were living in the border regions in 1990 and who
would not have commuted otherwise, is not statistically di⁄erent from zero.
Table A8 shows the e⁄ects for commuters in di⁄erent econometric models used.39
Overall, for commuters, positive self-selection seems to be present. The local average
treatment e⁄ect for a subpopulation of compliers is again insigni￿cant. The treatment
e⁄ects for all commuters, however, are equal to 4% of the mean of the total income (which
approximately equals ten). This is, in fact, what was expected, since migration usually
involves higher costs than commuting, indicating that the overall returns should be higher
for the latter.
6 Robustness checks
In addition to the changes in speci￿cation reported above, the following sensitivity analysis
was undertaken. First, I check how robust the results are to the inclusion of additional
controls. I include a dummy which equals one if a person was unemployed in 1990 to
check how the lagged employment status in￿ uences both decision to move and ex-post
incomes. I then add the household monthly income in 1990 in order to capture additional
household-level characteristics. Second, I improve on the validity of the instruments
controlling for the "nomenklatura" e⁄ect mentioned above. I use a telephone availability
in 1990 dummy to control for this social background. One may also argue that apart the
39Again, restricted model without human capital covariates generated qualitatively identical results
(available upon request).
24"nomenklatura" e⁄ect, it is also important to control for the ideology, since it may be
an important determinant of migration. Thus, to proxy for the ideological reasons I then
also include a variable that ranks political interests of a person before uni￿cation (from
"very strong" to "none"). Third, I exclude the self-employed from the sample, since there
might be self-selection into this group. Fourth, I retain all return and multiple movers in
the sample. Finally, I improve the de￿nition of the control group: I drop commuters from
the control group for migrants, and migrants - from the control group for commuters. It
is expected that, since the western wage earners are excluded from the stayers, the e⁄ects
should be larger.40 41
Table A9 shows these sensitivity checks. In general, the e⁄ects are similar to those
reported in Table A8. Contrary to expectations, dropping the actual and potential movers
from the respective control groups does not change the treatment e⁄ects. This, however,
contributes to the robustness of the results.42
40One could also argue that home ownership statuses before uni￿cation were di⁄erent in urban and
rural areas, the majority in rural areas being home owners. To control for this, data on rural / urban
residence before uni￿cation is needed. Such data, however, has not been available to the author.
41I have also estimated all the models dropping observations with missing 1990 information from the
sample. The results are not a⁄ected for commuters, but are not robust for migrants. The overall results
are available upon request.
42In addition, all models have been reestimated using labour income as a dependent variable. The
results for migration were qualitatively the same, OLS delivering the only signi￿cant and slightly higher
estimates (approx. 4% of the mean of the labour income). For commuters, consistent nonparametric
estimates were again signi￿cant, but slightly higher (4.6% of the mean of the labour income). Moreover,
LATE for compliers was marginally signi￿cant and equaled approximately to 4% of the mean of the labour
income. The contribution of the selection bias was again the same. These results seem to suggest that
commuting particularly pays-o⁄ with respect to the labour income, which is, in fact, true by de￿nition
of commuters.
257 Concluding remarks
The question of the returns to geographic mobility, especially in the context of transition
economies, remains di¢ cult to deal with, mainly due to data availability and identi￿cation
problems. This paper exploited a structure of the centrally planned economy of ex-
GDR and a "natural experiment" of German reuni￿cation, and attempted to make a
causal inference for the returns to East-West German migration and commuting. Pre-
uni￿cation home ownership was argued to provide an exogenous source of variation in
migration, and proximity to the West German border before uni￿cation - in commuting.
Both parametric and nonparametric sample selection models were estimated to control for
selection bias, and the e⁄ects of treatment (geographic mobility) on the treated (movers)
were calculated. Further, the local average treatment e⁄ect for the subpopulation of
compliers was estimated.
The main ￿ndings from this study are as follows. First, no evidence of positive selection
on unobservables for migrants is found, and positive self-selection for commuters seems
to exist. Second, no signi￿cant returns to migration in terms of total long-term income
were found. The returns for commuters are equal approximately 4% of the mean of the
total income; however, they are also insigni￿cant for compliers. A higher overall gain for
commuters is in line with expectations, taking into account the higher costs of migration
and lower unemployment rate for commuters than for migrants. This result may also
suggest that commuting might indeed be a substitute for migration. Third, these ￿ndings
seem to be robust to di⁄erent changes in speci￿cation and in the sample. Based on these
results, in the long run moving West does not appear to be a highly rewarded option for
eastern Germans. This fact, although subject to the assumptions and de￿nitions used in
this study, could constitute an important part of the explanation of the sluggish East-West
migration in Germany.
In addition, one should bear in mind that the results for migration have to be in-
26terpreted with caution. Moreover, the multinomial sample selection model, where the
choices are to migrate, commute or stay might deliver more precise estimates. This is left,
however, for future research.
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308 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Migration Commuting
Migrants Stayers Commuters Stayers
mean total annual income 39754 31125 43128 30009
(26828) (16937) (22084) (16739)
home owner in 1990 0.16 0.33
border with West Germany in 1990 0.48 0.27
sex 0.42 0.52 0.65 0.49
age in 1990 26.08 31.93 28.59 32.05
(11.36) (11.53) (11.07) (11.67)
spouse in 1990 0.61 0.74 0.69 0.74
university degree in 1990 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.09
any vocational education in 1990 0.78 0.88 0.83 0.88
employed in government sector in 1990 0.44 0.33 0.31 0.34
blue-collar employee in 1990 0.26 0.35 0.40 0.33
had a telephone in 1990 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.22
annual individual income in 1990 26358 24164 29378 23276
(21708) (12320) (18130) (11354)
state￿ s unemployment rate in 1992 10.51 10.49 10.70 10.45
(1.02) (0.93) (1.02) (0.91)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses. Incomes are in￿ated by regional CPIs to 2001 and are expressed in DM.
Sample size varies with the variables, minimum sample sizes are 3043 observations for migration, and 2953 observations
for commuting. Mean total annual income is the sum of average annual labour income (sum of wages, second job and
self-employment income) and annual social security bene￿ts (such as unemployment bene￿ts, maternity bene￿ts etc).
31Table A2: Means of the covariates by instruments
Migration Commuting
own90=1 own90=0 bwest90=1 bwest90=0
sex 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.51
age in 1990 32.29* 31.21* 31.11 31.82
spouse in 1990 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.73
years of schooling in 1990 11.86* 12.26* 12.27 12.06
university degree in 1990 0.05* 0.11* 0.09 0.09
any vocational education in 1990 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.87
employed in government sector in 1990 0.28* 0.37* 0.36 0.33
blue-collar employee in 1990 0.31* 0.36* 0.33 0.35
had a telephone in 1990 0.24 0.23 0.31* 0.20*
annual individual income in 1990 22758* 24973* 24576 23849
Notes: * di⁄erence in means signi￿cant at 5%. owner90 is a dummy which equals one if a person owned a house before
uni￿cation; bwest90 - a dummy which equals one if a person lived in the county that had a common border with West
Germany before uni￿cation. Incomes are in￿ated by regional CPIs to 2001 and are expressed in DM.
32Table A3: Reduced form estimates
Migration Commuting
Probit LPM Probit LPM
constant -0.79 0.18 -3.44 -0.36
(0.589) (0.070) (0.446) (0.104)
home owner in 1990 -0.42 -0.04
(0.093) (0.008)
border with West Germany in 1990 0.47 0.11
(0.061) (0.015)
sex -0.15 -0.02 0.35 0.07
(0.079) (0.009) (0.062) (0.013)
age -0.02 -0.004 0.07 0.01
(0.025) (0.003) (0.019) (0.004)
age2 0.00001 0.00003 -0.001 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.00004) (0.0003) (0.0001)
spouse in 1990 -0.15 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02
(0.103) (0.012) (0.081) (0.018)
university degree in 1990 0.20 0.02 0.25 0.05
(0.170) (0.022) (0.135) (0.031)
any vocational education in 1990 -0.11 -0.02 -0.15 -0.04
(0.141) (0.019) (0.115) (0.026)
employed in government sector in 1990 0.12 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
(0.093) (0.010) (0.074) (0.015)
blue-collar employee in 1990 -0.1 -0.01 0.14 0.03
(0.100) (0.009) (0.071) (0.015)
unemployment rate in the state, 1992 0.01 -0.001 0.12 0.03
(0.041) (0.005) (0.031) (0.007)
R2 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.06
F-test on instrument 30.23 62.52
# observations 3043 2953
Note: robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is migrating (columns 1-2) or commuting (columns
3-4) to West Germany. Probit reports coe¢ cients from probit Maximum Likelihood estimation, LPM reports coe¢ cients
from linear probability model. Covariates also include dummies for missing 1990 information.
33Table A4: Heckman￿ s second stage estimates
Migration Commuting
Migrants Stayers Commuter Stayers
constant 6.02 6.61 8.70 6.45
(1.286) (0.231) (0.810) (0.252)
sex 0.74 0.38 0.44 0.38
(0.125) (0.022) (0.064) (0.027)
age 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.15
(0.049) (0.009) (0.025) (0.010)
age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.001
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
spouse in 1990 -0.35 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08
(0.157) (0.028) (0.068) (0.029)
state￿ s unemployment rate, 1992 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.055) (0.010) (0.030) (0.013)
university degree in 1990 0.57 0.49 0.47 0.49
(0.221) (0.046) (0.098) (0.048)
any vocational education in 1990 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.15
(0.197) (0.038) (0.091) (0.041)
in government sector in 1990 0.12 0.19 -0.01 0.21
(0.141) (0.024) (0.061) (0.025)
blue-collar employee in 1990 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.10
(0.158) (0.023) (0.064) (0.025)
￿ 0.67 0.25 -0.02 0.08
(0.413) (0.259) (0.134) (0.130)
# observations 178 2865 430 2523
CM test 3rd moment -0.00004 -0.0040
(0.0008) (0.0020)
CM test 4th moment 0.0005 0.0115
(0.0039) (0.0057)
Note: standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for the ￿rst step generated regressors, and are reported
in parentheses. Depended variable is log of the total annual average income. ￿ is the inverse Mills ratio. Covariates also
include dummies for missing 1990 information. CM test refers to the conditional moment test for normality, in which
coe¢ cients (and standard errors) are reported from the regression of 3rd and 4th moments on a constant and scores from
probit.
34Table A5: Nonparametric second stage estimates
Migration Commuting
Migrants Stayers Commuters Stayers
constant 7.95 6.63 8.12 6.44
constant_heck 7.97 6.63 8.14 6.45
constant_andr 7.95 6.63 8.14 6.45
(1.399) (0.266) (0.592) (0.252)
sex 0.72 0.37 0.46 0.37
(0.125) (0.024) (0.060) (0.022)
age 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.15
(0.054) (0.010) (0.025) (0.010)
age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
spouse in 1990 -0.35 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.151) (0.029) (0.072) (0.028)
state￿ s unemployment rate, 1992 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.056) (0.011) (0.026) (0.012)
university degree in 1990 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.46
(0.240) (0.045) (0.082) (0.044)
any vocational education in 1990 -0.21 0.13 0.07 0.13
(0.192) (0.048) (0.079) (0.043)
in government sector in 1990 0.12 0.18 0.003 0.22
(0.142) (0.023) (0.061) (0.023)
blue-collar employee in 1990 -0.06 -0.09 0.002 -0.09
(0.124) (0.024) (0.058) (0.023)






# observations 177 2663 428 2431
Note: standard errors are calculated as in Das et al (2003) and are in paretheses. Depended variable is log of the
total annual average income. Constant_heck and constant_andr are intercepts estimated by Heckman (1990) and Andrews
and Schafgans (1998) semiparametric procedures respectively. Pscore is the estimated in the ￿rst stage propensity to move
West. Covariates also include dummy for missing 1990 information.
35Table A6: Leave-one-out cross validation
Migration Commuting
pscore order Migrants Stayers Commuters Stayers
0 84.75 709.03 107.10 643.63
1 84.40 709.57 107.57 643.96
2 85.30 706.88 106.42 644.33
3 86.11 706.49 106.50 644.85
4 85.75 706.51 107.38 644.41
5 85.60 707.12 108.81 644.88
Note: leave-one-out cross-validation criterion is the sum of squares of forecast errors, where all other observations were
used to predict each single observation, and the speci￿cation with the smallest sum of forecast errors is chosen. Pscore is
the estimated in the ￿rst stage propensity to move West. Covariates also include dummies for missing 1990 information.
Table A7: Intentions to treat e⁄ects, IV (LATE) and OLS estimates
Intentions to treat: Structural IV OLS
Move Income estimates estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Migration
home owner -0.039 0.011




border with the 0.111 0.022
West in 1990 (0.015) (0.022)
commute 0.199 0.396
(0.194) (0.028)
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. Upper panel A shows the estimates for migration, lower panel B -
for commuting. Dependent variable in column 1 is migration or commuting dummy respectively, dependent variable in
columns 2, 3, 4 is the log of average total annual income. Covariates include gender, age and its square, spouse indicator
in 1990, educational and occupational dummies in 1990, state￿ s unemployment rate in 1992 and dummies for missing 1990
information.
36Table A8: Treatment e⁄ects for movers
Migration Commuting
Parametric Nonparametric LATE Parametric Nonparametric LATE
-0.19 0.40 -0.27 0.27 0.42 0.20
(0.531) (0.233) (0.538) (0.230) (0.029) (0.194)
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the e⁄ects for sample selection models are calculated as
for the Oaxaca decomposition (Greene, 2000). Treatment e⁄ects are calculated as shown in Section 4. Dependent variable
in the regressions is average annual total income. "Parametric" refers to the Heckman￿ s (1976, 1979) two-stage sample
selection model; "Nonparametric" - nonparametric sample selection model of Das et al (2003);" LATE" - local average
treatment e⁄ect of Angrist et al (1996). In the reported nonparametric model the intercept is estimated according to
Andrews and Schafgans (1998).
Table A9: Robustness checks
Migration Commuting
Parametric Nonparametric LATE Parametric Nonparametric LATE
including unemployment in 1990
-0.13 0.47 -0.25 0.31 0.42 0.23
(0.525) (0.269) (0.535) (0.227) (0.029) (0.191)
including household income in 1990
-0.04 0.32 -0.03 0.27 0.40 0.23
(0.521) (2.461) (0.524) (0.228) (0.029) (0.192)
including telephone in 1990
-0.16 -0.14 -0.24 0.17 0.39 0.10
(0.529) (1.167) (0.535) (0.236) (0.072) (0.202)
including political interests in 1990
-0.39 0.41 -0.38 0.27 0.41 0.21
(0.534) (0.224) (0.541) (0.228) (0.029) (0.193)
excluding self-employed
-0.26 0.07 -0.32 0.31 0.45 0.22
(0.598) (0.104) (0.608) (0.235) (0.030) (0.197)
retaining return and multiple migrants
-0.22 0.07 -0.31 0.30 0.40 0.25
(0.482) (0.090) (0.497) (0.229) (0.027) (0.192)
excluding "movers" from the control groups
0.14 -0.52 0.03 0.24 0.43 0.19
(0.523) (0.612) (0.524) (0.227) (0.065) (0.192)
Note: see footnote of Table A8. Results are from the extended model that includes lagged university and vocational













Figure 1: Emigration from East German l￿nder to West Germany after the fall of the
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Figure 2: Kernel densities of the average annual total income for movers and stayers in
Germany after uni￿cation. Source: GSOEP. Notes: see Section 2 for de￿nitions.
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